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Abstract
We propose in the paper a new solution to the so-called Logical Omniscience
Problem of epistemic logic. Almost all attempts in the literature to solve this
problem consist in weakening the standard epistemic systems: weaker systems
are considered where the agents do not possess the full reasoning capacities of
ideal reasoners. We shall argue that this solution is not satisfactory: in this
way omniscience can be avoided, but many intuitions about the concepts of
knowledge and belief get lost. We shall show that axioms for epistemic logics
must have the following form: if the agent knows all premises of a valid inference
rule, and if she thinks hard enough, then she will know the conclusion. To
formalize such an idea, we propose to \dynamize" epistemic logic, that is, to
introduce a dynamic component into the language. We develop a logic based
on this idea and show that it is suitable for formalizing the notion of actual, or
explicit knowledge.
Keywords: Logics of knowledge and belief, Logical omniscience, Resource
bounded reasoner, Dynamic epistemic logic, Knowledge and time
1 Introduction and Preliminaries
Epistemic logic, or the logic of the concepts of knowledge and belief, has established
as an autonomous branch of logic since the work of Hintikka ([13].) The subject has
been studied extensively by philosophers, linguists, economists, and, more recently,
computer scientists.
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In computer science and articial intelligence epistemic logic
has been used for analyzing distributed systems, for knowledge representation, or for
the specication of multi-agent systems.
However, it is a very controversial matter whether epistemic logic is suitable for
these purposes. Most systems of epistemic logic have been developed in analogy to
1
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modal logic. This approach has clearly some advantages. Many results and methods
of modal logic can be transferred to epistemic logic, notably the techniques of the
possible worlds semantics. There are, however, severe objections against the modal
approach in epistemic logic. The most serious problem of this approach is perhaps
the so-called \logical omniscience problem (LOP)." It can be described informally as
follows. According to the standard approach, the agent should be an ideal logician
and reasoner in the following sense: she knows all logical truths, can (actually) draw
all consequences of a certain sentence and can identify all logical equivalences of a
given sentence. Such requirements are clearly too strong for a real agent, human
or non-human. Thus, the standard systems cannot capture the notion of knowledge
and belief adequately. The problem of logical omniscience is a severe obstacle for the
applicability of epistemic logic. For that reason, many attempts have been undertaken
to solve this problem. The goal of our paper is to assess how successful these attempts
can be and then to propose another solution to the LOP.
Before going on, let us state the problem more precisely. In the paper we consider
the concept of knowledge only, but the main arguments apply to the concept of
belief, too. By \modal epistemic logic" we mean, as proposed by Wuttich in [25],
those systems of epistemic logic which are developed in the modal tradition. Let us
assume a set Agt of n agents. The language of modal epistemic logic is built up
from a set At of propositional letters using the usual Boolean connectives of negation
and implication and the operators K
i
, each for one agent i. In the AI community
the systems S4
n
and S5
n
are most often considered as logics of rational knowledge
for the case of n agents. They consist of n copies of the modal systems S4 and S5,
respectively. Formally:
Denition 1 (The language of epistemic logic) Let At be a set of atomic for-
mulae and Agt = f1; : : : ; ng a set of agents. L
E
is the least set such that
1. At  L
E
2. If A 2 L
E
then :A 2 L
E
3. If A 2 L
E
and B 2 L
E
then (A! B) 2 L
E
4. If A 2 L
E
and i 2 Agt then K
i
A 2 L
E
The intended interpretation of the formula K
i
A is that the agent i knows that A.
The other truth-functional connectives are dened as usual. An objective formula is
one that does not contain any knowledge operator. We adopt the standard conventions
concerning the use of parentheses.
Denition 2 (The logics S4
n
and S5
n
) The modal epistemic logic S5
n
(for the
case of n agents) has the following axiom schemata:
PC. All theorems of the propositional calculus (PC).
K. K
i
(A! B)! (K
i
A! K
i
B)
T. K
i
A! A
4. K
i
A! K
i
K
i
A
2
5. :K
i
A! K
i
:K
i
A
The rules of inference are:
MP. Modus ponens: if A and A! B are theorems then B is a theorem.
NEC. Necessitation: if A is a theorem then so is K
i
A.
The logic S4
n
is obtained by dropping the axiom schema 5 from the above axiom-
atization of S5
n
.
The notions of proof, of theoremhood etc. with respect to a system S of modal
epistemic logic is dened as usual. The symbol `
S
A is used to denote the fact that
A is a theorem of S. A formula A is said to be an S-consequence from a set X of
formulae, denoted X `
S
A, just in case there are some B
1
; : : : ; B
m
2 X such that
B
1
^ : : :^B
m
! A is a theorem of S. If the system under consideration is clear from
the context, we can omit the index and write X ` A instead.
Axiom K says that an agent's knowledge is closed under modus ponens. Axiom
T states that knowledge implies truth. (It follows that an agent's knowledge is con-
sistent.) The axioms 4 and 5 are called positive and negative introspection axioms,
respectively. They say that an agent is aware of what she knows and what she does
not know. It is generally accepted that negative introspection is a more demanding
condition than positive introspection. Therefore many researchers argue that it is
more reasonable to adopt S4
n
as the logic of knowledge. In case one needs to distin-
guish between knowledge and belief, one can drop the schema T or replace it by the
weaker axiom D, that is, the schema K
i
A! :K
i
:A. The system obtained from S5
n
by replacing the schema T by the schema D is known as KD45
n
and is considered by
many researchers as the standard logic of rational belief. Besides these three systems
sometimes other systems are also considered. The minimal normal modal system,
containing K as the only modal axiom, is called the system K
n
, or just K in the case
of one agent.
It is well-known that the most common systems of modal epistemic logic can be
determined by suitable classes of Kripke models with n accessibility relations. In
particular, the accessibility relations of S5
n
-models are equivalence relations, those of
S4
n
-models are reexive and transitive, and KD45
n
-models are serial, transitive, and
Euclidean (cf. [2], [8], [11], [7].)
The logical omniscience problem for modal epistemic logic can be stated as follows.
The following inference rules are valid for S5
n
and related systems:
NEC. If A is a theorem then so is K
i
A
MON. If A! B is a theorem then so is K
i
A! K
i
B
CGR. If A$ B is a theorem then so is K
i
A$ K
i
B
The three rules NEC, MON, CGR are called necessitation rule, monotony rule,
and congruence rule, respectively. They are derivable when the schema K and the
necessitation rule are assumed, that is, in the minimal modal system K
n
already. An
agent who is described by such a logic is said to be logically omniscient, because
she knows all logical truths (according to NEC), she knows all logically consequences
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of a sentence that she knows (according to MON), and she can identify all logical
equivalent sentences of a given sentence, according to CGR. Such an agent cannot be
a real one. No human agent has such reasoning capacities. We cannot build articial
agents that possess the reasoning power described by S5
n
and related systems. If
we consider real agents and ask what they actually know, we can check empirically
that an agent's knowledge is often not closed any logical law. Realistic agents may
know a very restricted set of logical laws. They know only some, but not all logical
consequences of their knowledge. We cannot realistically expect an agent's knowledge
to be closed under even very elementary logical laws, e.g., modus ponens. That is,
even the axiom schema K is a strong idealization. Modal epistemic logics do not
capture the notions of knowledge and belief adequately.
If we agree that modal epistemic logics do not describe what agents actually know,
we can ask the question: what do they describe then? Well, they are logics of a related,
but dierent concept. It is remarked by several authors that the laws of these systems
are much more acceptable if the formulaK
i
A is read \the agent i knows A implicitly"
([18], [6],) \A follows from i's knowledge" ([7]), \the agent i carries the information
A" ([1],) or \the agent i possibly knows A", instead of \the agent i knows A". Modal
epistemic logics should be interpreted as logics of possible, or implicit knowledge, and
not as logics of actual, or explicit knowledge.
For reasoning about agents the concept of actual knowledge is much more impor-
tant than that of possible knowledge. In order to predict or to explain an agent's
actions we need to know what the agent actually knows, and not what she possibly
knows. For modeling realistic agents we need other logics which are capable of cap-
turing the concept of actual knowledge. Such logic may not suer from the LOP. In
the next section we shall discuss some common ways to solve this problem. After
showing that the strategy of weakening epistemic logic has many disadvantages we
shall propose an alternative approach to the problem. The intuitions of our strategy
will be explained in section 3. A formal system which can cope with the problems of
the traditional approaches will be developed in section 4 following the new strategy.
The paper closes with a discussion of related works, open problems and directions for
future work.
2 Strategies to Avoid Logical Omniscience
An obvious strategy to solve the logical omniscience problem is to weaken epistemic
logic. One denies the universal validity of the mentioned inference rules NEC, MON,
and CGR, or one of the essential axioms like K. In fact, almost all attempts to solve the
LOP have in common that they consider systems that are weaker than the standard
modal epistemic logics (cf. [3], [5], [6], [14], [18], [21], [22], [23], [25].) One can
construct systems that falsify either the inference rules or the axioms of the standard
modal systems. For example, modal systems which are not normal can be used to
describe an agent who does not know all logical truths. If we use neighborhood
semantics instead of Kripke semantics, we can get weaker modal systems (the so-
called classical systems) for which neither the rule NEC nor the axiom schema K is
valid, therefore the agents' knowledge is not closed under logical consequence (cf. [2],
[22].) In this way, the original version of the LOP could be solved. But here some
care is needed: some systems solve the original version, but not other versions of the
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LOP. If the monotony rule and/or the congruence rule are valid for a system, or if an
agent does not know all theorems of classical logic, but knows all theorem of another
(nontrivial) logic, then the agent in this system must still be viewed as ideal: real
agents simply never achieve such reasoning capacities which can be described by such
a system. For example, the agent described by the minimal classical modal system
E (cf. [22], [2]) knows all logical equivalences of a sentence she knows. An agent in
Levesque's logic ([18]) does not know all truths of classical logic, but she knows all
theorems of a relevance logic. In the same way, an agent in Ho Ngoc Duc's system
([3]) does not know all classical theorems, but knows all theorems of a three-valued
logic. Such attempts cannot be considered satisfactory solutions to the LOP.
A number of systems have been proposed which assume still more restricted rea-
soning capacities of the agents. To construct such a system we can postulate, for
example, that the agent only knows some \obvious" logical truths, but not neces-
sarily the \more complicated" ones. We can assume that the agent can draw all
\obvious" consequences, but not any arbitrary consequence of a certain sentence. We
can do it by postulating that the deduction mechanism of the agents is not complete,
that is, it is not powerful enough to allow the agents to draw all logical consequences
of their knowledge. The regularities of an agent's knowledge could be formalized by
a set of suitable axioms. The more axioms are postulated, the more rational is the
agent. With the aid of weak epistemic logics we can classify the agents according to
their logical capacities. This approach is pursued by Stelzner in his \parameterized
epistemic logic" ([23],) or Konolige in his \deduction model"([16].) If the agent's
inference mechanism is kept very weak, then logical omniscience could be avoided.
Besides this axiomatic approach we can also pursue a more semantical approach. One
can show that logical omniscience can be avoided if one allow \impossible possible
worlds" in which the valuation of the sentences of the language is arbitrary. In other
words, the logical laws do not hold in the \impossible possible worlds" ([22], [21]).
Another solution is to introduce a new operator of awareness into the language and
to require that belief include awareness ([6].) Because it is possible that the agent is
aware of some sentence but she is not aware of its logical consequences or its equiv-
alent sentences, the theorems and inference rules of modal epistemic systems do not
hold in general.
Although the deduction model, the approach with impossible possible worlds and
the approach with the awareness operator solve the LOP technically, they cannot
be regarded satisfactory. New problems arise in these approaches besides the old
problems of the possible worlds approach. Here we shall not discuss these problems
in details, nor shall we try to improve any of these approaches. We shall rather present
a more fundamental criticism of the common strategy of all these approaches, namely
the strategy of weakening epistemic logic.
The discussion of the logical omniscience problem in the literature has concen-
trated mainly on the issue: in which way can logical omniscience be avoided. But the
LOP has another aspect which is often overlooked in the discussion: what is left if one
restricts the reasoning capacities of the agents, for example by denying the validity of
the rules NEC, MON and CGR or of the axiom schema K? Is there still a reasonable
way to describe an agent's knowledge if the regularities of the agent's knowledge is
too weak to be described by these axioms and rules?
An attempt to cope with this challenge is to postulate axioms which describe the
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regularities of the agent's knowledge. Such axioms shall express the intuitive idea
that the agent is somehow rational, or logical. The axioms are generally of the form:
the belief set of the agent is closed under a certain valid rule of inference of logic,
i.e., if all premises of the rule are known, then the conclusion is known. (This is
also the general form of a theorem of a standard epistemic logic.) In this way we
can get subsystems of the logic K which do not suer from the LOP. The strategy of
weakening epistemic logic allows us to consider agents who are very restricted in their
reasoning capacities. We can describe and classify them according to their rationality.
We would have a hierarchy of agents: some agents are ideal, who are modeled by the
logic K or its extensions, others are less ideal and can be described by its subsystems.
The strategy of weakening epistemic logic solves the logical omniscience problem.
However, the disadvantages cannot be overlooked. First, this approach is only suited
to analyze static knowledge, that is, we can at most describe the knowledge sets at
one single time point. This is of course not a deciency of these logics alone, but
of most epistemic logics developed up to now. Second, the categories of agents we
describe and classify by our logics are merely imaginary: they do not exist in reality.
It is very implausible to assume that there are agents who always think in some xed
patterns which can be captured by one of our logics. Each agent represents rather
some mixture of several logics, at some time point they can be described by one, at
other time points by another, and still at other by none of our logics at all. Third,
however weak our postulates may be, they may still be too strong for some agents.
Given the information that an agent's knowledge includes a set X of sentences, in
reality we can never infer reliably that the agent knows all sentences of the deductive
closure cl
S
(X) of X with respect to a deductive system S, even if we suppose S to
be very weak (but not degenerate in the sense that cl
S
(X) = X.) This point has
led many people to raise the question if epistemic logic is possible at all, or do we
have to leave the realm of logic when reasoning about knowledge and belief ([15], [1].)
Fourth, we have the feeling that our logics are too weak. Surely, we want to avoid
logical omniscience. On the other hand, we are interested in having epistemic logics
which are strong enough to allow suciently many conclusions from a given set of
facts we know about the agent's propositional attitudes. We want to have agents who
do know at least a (suciently) large class of logical truths, and can draw suciently
many conclusions from their knowledge. This is the dilemma on logical omniscience
on the one side and logical ignorance on the other side. That is why we ask the
question before: what is left from epistemic logic if we deny the validity of the axiom
K or of the congruence rule and stronger principles? What we need is something
between two extremes. Can we have some reasonable thing like that?
Our goal is to show that we can solve this dilemma. We shall now propose another
strategy to solve the logical omniscience problem which also solves the problem of
logical ignorance. Our strategy starts with the observation that the laws of (classical)
logic are not sentences about the world, they do not tell us anything about what is
the case in the world. If we say that the epistemic agent knows the laws of logic, we
do not mean that she knows some facts about the world, but rather that she is able to
use these laws to draw conclusions from what she already knows. The laws of logic are
what the agent knows implicitly; she does not need to possess them permanently. It
suces if she can recall them when she needs them in order to infer new information
from her explicit data base. At a given time the set of logical laws that the agent
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has in her memory is restricted, and so is the set of logical consequences of all what
she knows explicitly. In this way we can achieve a good tradeo between logical
omniscience and logical ignorance: the agent is surely not omniscient with respect to
her actual or explicit knowledge, but neither is she logically ignorant. Our task is to
nd a suitable way to express this idea formally.
3 Dynamizing Epistemic Logic
Let us consider an inference rule, say R. It can be a valid inference rule of classical
logic, or some other (non-classical) logic, for example, intuitionist logic, conditional
logic or relevant logic. Assume that an agent accepts R as valid and she can use R.
What does it mean? In the modal approach we formalize this idea by an axiom saying
that the knowledge set of the agent is closed under this rule, that is, if all premises
of the rule are known then the conclusion of R is also known. However, as we noted
above, it is only true of implicit knowledge. In the context of explicit knowledge it
must mean something dierent. It means rather that, if the agent knows all premises
of the rule, and if she perform the inference according to the rule R, then she will know
the conclusion. The agent does not know the conclusion automatically, but rather as
the result of some action, viz. the (mental) action of performing the corresponding
inference. If she does not perform this action, then we cannot require her to know
the conclusion, although this conclusion may seem to be an obvious consequences of
the sentences under consideration. Especially, a logical axiom can be viewed as an
inference rule without any premises. We cannot require the agent to know all axioms
automatically and permanently, she must rather carry out some action before she can
acquire knowledge of a certain axiom. It is possible that the agent knows all logical
truths, but merely in principle. This knowledge is only implicit. Factually she never
knows them all at once explicitly.
For formalizing the reasoning actions it is natural to use (a form of) dynamic logic
(cf. [12], [8].) Thus, we can add a set of basic actions to the language of epistemic
logic. The set of formulae now includes formulae like [R
i
]K
i
A or hR
i
iK
i
A with the
intended meaning: \always after using rule R (or sometimes after using R) the agent
i knows A". The formalization of the idea that an agent accepts and is able to use
an inference rule is straightforward. For example, the idea that the agent i accepts
modus ponens can be formalized by the axiom: K
i
A ^ K
i
(A ! B) ! hMP
i
iK
i
B.
This axiom says no more than if agent i knows A and she also knows that A implies
B, then after a suitable inference step she will know B.
2
As the axioms can be viewed as special inference rules we can introduce an action
corresponding to each agent and each axiom of the basis logic, which describes the
ability of the agent to use this axiom in her reasoning. (In general, dierent agents
may have dierent logics, so that the sets of basic actions are dierent for dierent
agents. However, in the paper we assume a set of homogeneous agents, for the sake
of simplicity.) By means of the familiar program connectives for dynamic logic (such
as composition or iteration) we can formalize the idea that the agent may know the
2
Instead of K
i
A ! hR
i
iK
i
B we could also introduce a binary operator K
i
AhR
i
iK
i
B with the
interpretation \in a state where the agent i knows A, after the application of the rule R she may
know B". However, the former notation is closer to that of dynamic logic, whereas the latter one
does not oer any obvious advantage.
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consequences of some sentence which she already knows explicitly, provided that she
performs the right reasoning steps. For example, assume that the agent i knows
the conjunction of A and A ! B, that is, K
i
(A ^ (A ! B)). In all normal modal
systems we can deduce K
i
(A ^ B). However, this inference is not sound for realistic
agents. There is no guarantee that the agent will know A ^ B automatically, as
the modal approach suggests. We can only say that if the agent reasons correctly,
then she will know A ^ B. In our concrete case, let CE, CI, MP be the conjunction
elimination rule, the conjunction introduction rule, and modus ponens, respectively,
and let the symbol \;" denote the composition of actions. We write (CE;MP ;CI)
i
as an abbreviation for CE
i
;MP
i
;CI
i
(\agent i performs CE, then MP , and then
CI".) Then our theorem must be: K
i
(A^ (A! B)) ! h(CE;MP ;CI)
i
iK
i
(A ^B),
and not K
i
(A ^ (A! B)) ! K
i
(A ^B) as in the standard modal approach.
In general, suppose that B follows from A in some basis logic (which is accepted
by the agent) and that the agent knows A. For explicit knowledge we cannot assume
that the agent automatically knows B. Let a proof of B from A be given, where
the axioms and inference rules used in the proof are R
1
,...,R
n
(in this order, where
the same axiom or inference rule may occur at dierent places in the sequence.)
Then, instead of the monotonicity rule in the standard modal approach we have the
axiom: K
i
A ! h(R
1
; : : : ;R
n
)
i
iK
i
B. This axiom says that if the agent i performs
the sequence of actions corresponding to the rules from R
1
to R
n
(in this order)
then she may know B under the given circumstances. Whether or not the agent
can come to this conclusion depends crucially on her logical ability. In this way we
see that the logical omniscience problem can be solved easily in a natural way: we
can describe agents whose knowledge may or may not be closed under logical laws.
On the other hand we can still say that the agent thinks rationally, that she is not
logically ignorant. Theoretically she may produce all logical truths, and all logical
consequences of her knowledge, but only if she is interested in doing so, if she has
enough time and memory, et cetera.
In the above argumentation we have made an implicit assumption. We have
assumed that all premises, once known by the agent, are still available after the agent
performs a reasoning step. In the previous example, if the agent forgets the premise
A immediately after using modus ponens, then she cannot apply the conjunction
introduction rule to come to the conclusion A ^ B. Thus, we have to postulate that
the agent does not forget what she previously knows after performing some reasoning
action. This assumption can be formalized using persistence axioms for knowledge,
for example, K
i
A! [R
i
]K
i
A.
Are such persistence axioms reasonable? Only under two conditions. First, the
truth value of A should not change over time. If A becomes false after i's inference
using rule R then it is not reasonable to postulate that i still knows A after the use of
R. This point should be taken into account when we formally dene the language of
our logic. In particular, if our language contains temporal indexicals then sentences
containing them cannot be regarded as persistent. Second, the truth value of A may
not change through the agent's actions. This excludes formulae such that :K
i
B:
it is possible that agent i does not know B now, but will know it as a result of
her reasoning. In general, a formula in which a knowledge operator occurs essentially
negative (i.e., within the scope of an odd number of the negation sign) is not a suitable
candidate for a persistent one. So, we may assume that persistent formulae are built
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up from objective formulae, conjunction, disjunction, and the knowledge operators
only.
Let us now examine how the ability of the agents to introspect their knowledge
can be captured within our dynamic framework. Let I
i
be i's action of introspection.
3
Consider positive introspection rst. Suppose that i knows A. Can we infer that she
will know after introspecting her knowledge that she knows A? Not necessarily! We
can assume that i will know that she previously knows A, but to support the inference
that after her introspection action the agent knows that she knowsA we need one more
argument, namely that i's knowledge of A will not be changed through her reasoning
actions. We have argued previously that such a persistence axiom is reasonable for
a subclass of formulae. Thus, we have the following axiom of positive introspection,
which corresponds to the schema 4 in modal epistemic logic: K
i
A ! hI
i
iK
i
K
i
A,
provided that A is persistent.
The same argumentation can be used to show that the candidate for the negative
introspection axiom :K
i
A! hI
i
iK
i
:K
i
A is not acceptable. It can happen that after
a reasoning step the agent knows something what she did not know previously. If we
extend the language to include objective or absolute time, then a statement such as
:K
t
i
A! hI
i
iK
t+1
i
:K
t
i
A would be absolutely reasonable. However, this issue will not
be pursued further in the present paper.
In order to dene systems of dynamic epistemic logic formally we can x a basis
logic and then associate with each axiom schema and each inference rule an atomic
action. The \external" language (i.e., the language in which one can speak about
agents) is then dened over this set of atomic actions. The \external" logic comprises
all theorems of dynamic logic and the specic epistemic axioms discussed above.
However, there are some problems with this approach. First, there might be
many dierent, but equivalent axiomatizations of the basis logic, so the choice of the
basic actions must be arbitrary. Moreover, as the resulting dynamic-epistemic system
contains dynamic logic entirely, it becomes very complex and therefore unhandly.
Even more importantly, in most cases we do not need to care about what course of
actions the agents just carried out; we are only interested in the result of the actions,
so to speak. We only need to know that a certain agent has carried out some reasoning
steps, and after that she gains certain new information.
This last point leads us to another approach. We introduce an auxiliary action F
i
with the following intended reading: do any one of the atomic actions (we don't know
what action;) repeat the non-deterministic choice nitely many times (at least once,
but we don't know how many times!) The action F
i
could be interpreted as a course
of thought of the agent i. From the viewpoint of dynamic logic: if the set of all atomic
actions associated with the agent i and her basis logic is a nite set fr
1
i
; : : : ; r
n
i
g, then
F
i
can be viewed as (r
1
i
[ r
2
i
[ : : : [ r
n
i
)
+
, where the symbols [ and
+
denote choice
and non-zero iteration, respectively.
4
The choice of the symbols F
i
is not accidental
at all: in temporal logic it stands for the operator \Future". It turns out that our
3
One may ask how seriously one can take introspectionas action. Well, it is true that introspection
may dier from the \genuine" reasoning actions in some aspects. However, the dierences are not
quite signicant. It seems reasonable to treat introspection as test of a certain kind, which is used
by the agents to reason about their own mental state.
4
In dynamic logic another form of iteration is considered, viz. the one that allows for running
a program zero time, denoted by

. But one can easily extend dynamic logic to include non-zero
iteration as well.
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auxiliary action behaves in the same manner as the future operator of temporal logic:
the operator hF i satises all the axioms for the minimal temporal logic K
t
4. It is
no surprise at all: we know that the minimal temporal logic can be embedded into
dynamic logic, and one way to do this is to take the iteration of an action to interpret
the future operator. The formal language in which our dynamic epistemic logics are
formulated is called L
DE
and will be dened in the following section.
4 Dynamic Epistemic Logic
4.1 The language of dynamic epistemic logic
Denition 3 (The language L
DE
) Let Agt = f1; : : : ; ng be a set of n agents and
let L
E
be the language of epistemic logic as dened in Denition 1. L
DE
is the least
set such that
1. L
E
 L
DE
2. If A 2 L
DE
then :A 2 L
DE
3. If A 2 L
DE
and B 2 L
DE
then (A! B) 2 L
DE
4. If A 2 L
DE
then hF
i
iA 2 L
DE
Conjunction, disjunction and the operator [F
i
] dual to hF
i
i are dened as usual.
The formula hF
i
iA is read: \A is true after some course of thought of i", [F
i
]A
means \A is true after any course of thought of i". (We could think of hF
i
i and
[F
i
] as the modalities \at some future times" and \at all future times" of temporal
logic, but now time is subjective time, i.e., agent-dependent, generated by the agent's
actions.) Note that we do not allow the operator hF
i
i to occur inside the scope of any
knowledge operator. The reason is that such expressions are indexicals: they contain
temporal indexicals like \later" or \always" implicitly. We want to exclude indexical
expressions from our language because they require special treatment, which could
be very involved and may obscure more important points.
Denition 4 The sublanguage L
+
E
of L
E
is the smallest set of formulae from L
E
which contains all objective formulae and is closed under the condition: if A;B 2 L
+
E
and i 2 Agt then f(A ^B); (A _B);K
i
Ag  L
+
E
.
4.2 The system DES4
n
Now we go on to dene an axiomatic system for reasoning about the dynamics of
knowledge along the lines described in the previous section. We have three groups
of axioms: the usual axioms of the propositional calculus, axioms for temporal logic,
and axioms governing the interaction between knowledge and reasoning activities.
Denition 5 (The system DES4
n
) The logic DES4
n
(Dynamic-Epistemic S4
n
) has
the following axiom schemata:
PC1. A! (B ! A)
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PC2. (A! (B ! C))! ((A! B)! (A! C))
PC3. (:B ! :A)! (A! B)
TL1. [F
i
](A! B)! ([F
i
]A! [F
i
]B)
TL2. [F
i
]A! [F
i
][F
i
]A
DE1. K
i
A ^K
i
(A! B) ! hF
i
iK
i
B
DE2. K
i
A! A
DE3. K
i
A! [F
i
]K
i
A, provided that A 2 L
+
E
DE4. hF
i
iK
i
(A! (B ! A))
DE5. hF
i
iK
i
((A! (B ! C))! ((A! B)! (A! C)))
DE6. hF
i
iK
i
((:B ! :A)! (A! B))
DE7. hF
i
iK
i
(K
i
A! A)
DE8. K
i
A! hF
i
iK
i
K
i
A, provided that A 2 L
+
E
The rules of inference are:
R1. Modus ponens: if A and A! B are theorems then B is a theorem.
R2. Necessitation: if A is a theorem then so is [F
i
]A.
In these axioms and rules, the index i ranges over the whole set Agt of agents. The
axioms PC1 { PC3 together with the rule R1 axiomatize completely the propositional
calculus. Together with TL1, TL2 and R2 they form a complete axiomatization of
the minimal temporal logic of transitive time. The axioms DE1 { DE7 describe the
dynamics of knowledge. Axiom DE1 says that the agents are capable of using modus
ponens. Axiom DE2 is the well-known schema T saying that knowledge entails truth.
Axiom DE3 says that agents do not forget what they know when they are reasoning.
Axioms DE4 { DE6 state that the agents are able to use the axioms PC1 { PC3 of
classical logic in their reasoning. Axiom DE7 says that agents potentially trust their
knowledge: when thinking about themselves, they think that what they know must
be true (as opposed to what they merely believe.) Finally, DE8 says that the agents
are capable of positive introspection. Of course, only instances of these schemata
which are well-formed formulae are allowed.
The notions of a proof, a theorem, and a consistent formula or set of formulae
(with respect to the logic DES4
n
) are dened as usual. The provability relation is
denoted `
DES4
n
, where the index may be omitted if no confusion can occur. Moreover,
we say that a formula A 2 L
E
is PC-provable, in symbol `
PC
A, just in case A can
be proved using only instances of the schemata PC1 { PC3 (in the sublanguage L
E
)
and modus ponens.
Of course, we can postulate that the agents can use further simple tautologies
and inference rule in their reasoning. For example, we can include axioms such that
K
i
A ^K
i
B ! hF
i
iK
i
(A ^B), or hF
i
iK
i
(A _ :A). However, this is not necessary at
all, because they can be proved, as we shall see later.
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4.3 Some features of DES4
n
Theorem 6 (Consistency) The system DES4
n
is consistent.
Proof To see that the system DES4
n
is consistent, i.e., no contradiction can be
derived from it, it suces to notice that all axioms and inference rules of DES4
n
can be mapped to valid formulae and inference rules of the propositional calculus
by deleting all occurrences of K
i
and hF
i
i from them. Therefore, all theorems of
DES4
n
must become propositional tautologies when all occurrences of K
i
and hF
i
i
are deleted. Hence, a formula like A ^ :A cannot be derived.
The following theorem states that DES4
n
solves the logical omniscience problem.
It says that none of the rules NEC, MON, and CGR is valid. Moreover, an agent's
explicit knowledge (or her information state) at a time, i.e., the totality of all what
this agent knows at that time, needs not be closed under any nontrivial logical rule.
5
Theorem 7 (Non-Omniscience) 1. The following inference rules are not deriv-
able in DES4
n
.
NEC. If A is a theorem then so is K
i
A
MON. If A! B is a theorem then so is K
i
A! K
i
B
CGR. If A$ B is a theorem then so is K
i
A$ K
i
B
2. The following formulae are not provable:
(a) K
i
(A! B) ! (K
i
A! K
i
B)
(b) K
i
B ! K
i
(A! B)
(c) K
i
(A ^B)! K
i
A
(d) K
i
(A ^B)! K
i
A ^K
i
B
(e) K
i
A ^K
i
B ! K
i
(A ^B)
(f) K
i
A! K
i
(A _B)
(g) K
i
A _K
i
B ! K
i
(A _B)
(h) K
i
::A! K
i
A
(i) K
i
A! K
i
K
i
A
(j) :K
i
A! K
i
:K
i
A
Proof We can construct easily interpretations such that (i) all axioms of DES4
n
are
valid, (ii) the DES4
n
-rules of inference lead from valid formulae to valid ones, and
(iii) the formulae and rules listed above are invalidated. We omit the details.
5
An agent's knowledge is of course closed under trivial rules likeA ` A: a formula likeK
i
A! K
i
A
should be in any case valid. But such a formula does not say anything about the agent's reasoning
capacities. It is not a genuine epistemic statement.
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An agent described by the logic DES4
n
is not logically omniscient. On the other
hand, we cannot say that she is not rational: the agent is rational, because she can
(at least in principle) perform actions to close her knowledge under logical laws, as
the following theorems show. Instead of the necessitation rule and monotony rule in
modal epistemic logic we have now a theorem stating that the agents can know all
classical theorems and can draw all consequences of what they know, provided that
they perform the right reasoning.
Theorem 8 Let A, B be objective formulae. The following inference rules are deriv-
able in DES4
n
:
R3. If `
PC
A then `
DES4
n
hF
i
iK
i
A.
R4. If `
PC
A! B then `
DES4
n
K
i
A! hF
i
iK
i
B.
Proof See the appendix.
Corollary 9 Assume that A, B are objective formulae. The following formulae are
theorems of DES4
n
:
1. K
i
B ! hF
i
iK
i
(A! B)
2. K
i
(A ^B)! hF
i
iK
i
A
3. K
i
(A ^B)! hF
i
iK
i
A ^ hF
i
iK
i
B
4. K
i
A! hF
i
iK
i
(A _B)
5. K
i
A _K
i
B ! hF
i
iK
i
(A _B)
6. K
i
::A! hF
i
iK
i
A
In fact, the above rules and theorems are derivable for a larger class of formulae,
not only for objective ones. The following list comprises some more provable formulae
of DES4
n
. They say that if all premises of a valid inference rule are known or will be
known, then after some steps of reasoning the agents will know the conclusion. We
still assume that A and B are objective. Their proofs are found in the appendix.
Theorem 10 The following formulae are theorems of DES4
n
:
1. K
i
A ^ hF
i
iK
i
(A! B)! hF
i
iK
i
B
2. K
i
A ^K
i
B ! hF
i
iK
i
(A ^B)
3. K
i
A ^ hF
i
iK
i
B ! hF
i
iK
i
(A ^B)
4. K
i
(A ^B)! hF
i
i(K
i
A ^K
i
B)
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5 Conclusions and Open Problems
5.1 Summary
We have shown how to solve the logical omniscience problem of epistemic logic while
preserving the intuition that the agents are logical, rational beings. Our strategy
consists in taking the dynamic aspect of knowledge into account. We have argued that
the correct form of an axiom for epistemic should be: if an agent knows all premises
of a valid inference rule, and if she performs the right reasoning, then she will know
the conclusion as well. Our strategy can do justice to the intuition that the agents are
neither logically omniscient nor logically ignorant. They are non-omniscient, because
their actual (or explicit) knowledge at a single time point needs not be closed under
any logical law. It is even possible that they do not know any logical truth at all at
some of their information states. On the other hand, they are non-ignorant, because
they are capable of logical thinking. They can use their reasoning capacities to infer
new information from what they already know. Their rationality is not restricted by
any articial, ad hoc postulate saying that their inference mechanisms are incomplete.
If an agent performs the correct inferences and if she has enough time, then she might
arrive at an ideal information state where all logical consequences of her current beliefs
have been drawn. This ideal state can never be achieved by real agents, but this is
another matter.
5.2 Related works
To our knowledge, there exists no similar work in the literature which pursues the
strategy of dynamizing epistemic logic in order to solve the dilemma of logical om-
niscience and logical ignorance. Most close to our approach are perhaps works on
\parameterized epistemic logic", proposed e.g. by Stelzner ([23],) where knowledge
is time (agent, context ...) dependent. However, in his formal systems Stelzner does
not consider the concepts of knowledge and belief, but a related concept, the concept
of a (hypothetical) obligation to defend some sentence. The latter concept is related
to the former in the following way: in a rational discourse, if an agent asserts some
sentence, then she has the obligation to defend it when it is challenged, because she
has made public through her assertion that she believes in the sentence. Stelzner
investigates axioms to describe agents in a rational discourse. These axioms say, for
example, that if an agent is obligated to defend A at t and B can be inferred from
A by one inference step, then the agent can be obligated to defend B at time t + 1.
(A time line isomorph to the natural numbers, generated by the consecutive \moves"
in the discourse, is assumed. The obligation to defend B is only hypothetical, be-
cause it does not arise if B is not challenged.) With the aid of such axioms one can
classify agents according to their rationality. Stelzner's logic could be reinterpreted
as formalizing the concept of implicit, or possible knowledge, but not the concept of
explicit, or actual knowledge: a statement such as K
t
i
(A ^ B) ! K
t+1
i
A is perhaps
more acceptable than the axiom K
t
i
(A ^ B) ! K
t
i
(A), but it is still a too strong
requirements for the notion of actual knowledge. In contrast, We have tried to show
how the concept of actual knowledge can be captured.
In the literature on belief revision some authors have considered belief-changing
actions. For example, Van Linder, van der Hoek and Meyer ([19], [20]) have done
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some work to formalize the change of knowledge through actions. However, they made
very strong assumptions about knowledge: their agents are logically omniscient. The
actions they consider lead from one deductively closed belief set to another. Thus,
their work should be read in terms of information dynamics, and not knowledge
dynamics.
5.3 Future directions
We can develop variants of DES4
n
to describe dierent sorts of agents. For instance,
we could modify the axiom system to formalize the concept of belief. We can base
epistemic logic on another, non-classical logic. We could also add some more axioms
or drop some of the axioms of DES4
n
. How to do it concretely depends crucially on
our intended application. At the moment we are working to integrate our dynamic
epistemic logic into a framework for reasoning about actions in multi-agent systems.
By dening the proof system DES4
n
we have provided a procedural semantics
for the concept of knowledge. It remains unclear whether or not the system DES4
n
comprises all valid formulae of the language L
DE
. To answer this question we need to
develop an intuitively acceptable declarative semantics for the concept of knowledge.
It is possible to develop a model theory along the lines of [4], so that we may prove
completeness of DES4
n
with respect to the dened models. However, such a model
theory is simply a reformulation of the procedural semantics, it does not provide us
with a tool to determine if all valid epistemic statements have been captured by the
proof system. A well motivated and intuitively acceptable semantics should allow us
to analyze the epistemic concepts of knowledge and belief in term of simpler and more
fundamental concepts. The appeal to the concepts of \epistemic alternatives" and
\possible worlds" does not help, as the problems of the modal approach show.
Another open issue is to nd a way to incorporate indexical knowledge in our
framework. We have so far ignored this issue and exclude indexical expressions from
our language. However, for many applications we must be able to treat indexical
knowledge adequately. Some work has been done on this issue, e.g. by Lesperance
and Levesque ([17].) However, their and related works should be seen as dealing
with indexical information (or indexical possible knowledge), and not with genuine
indexical knowledge, for the reasons explained earlier. Thus, much work still remains
to be done.
So far our logic has been monotonic in two aspects. First, the consequence op-
eration of DES4
n
is monotonic. Second, the knowledge of the agents always grows
over time. A very interesting, still open problem is to develop dynamic epistemic log-
ics based on non-monotonic logic, where the agents can revise their knowledge when
they nd out that their knowledge is inconsistent. We may expect to nd interesting
connections with two other, very active elds of AI research, viz. to non-monotonic
reasoning and to the logic of belief revision. This seems to be a promising eld of
research and needs further investigations.
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A Formal Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 8
First, note that [F
i
]A ^ hF
i
iB ! hF
i
i(A ^ B) and hF
i
ihF
i
iA ! hF
i
iA are DES4
n
-
provable. Moreover, if A! B is DES4
n
-theorem then so is hF
i
iA! hF
i
iB. We shall
make extensive use of these facts in our proof without mentioning them explicitly. To
shorten the proofs we assume that all theorems and rules of PC and K
t
4 have been
derived, so we do not have to write them down explicitly.
Consider rule R3. Let `
PC
A. We show `
DES4
n
hF
i
iK
i
A by induction on the
length m of the proof of A. If m = 1 then A must be an instance of one of the axiom
schemata PC1{PC3. The claim follows from DE4{DE6. If m > 1 then A must be
obtained by applying modus ponens from, say, B and B ! A, which are PC-provable
in less than m steps. So we assume that there is a PC-proof of A of length m where
in the k-th and l-th lines we had proved B and B ! A. The PC-proof of A can be
extended to a DES4
n
-proof of K
i
A as follows:
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(k) B Ass.
(l) B ! A Ass.
(m) A (k), (l), R1
(m+1) hF
i
iK
i
B Ind. Hyp., (k)
(m+2) [F
i
]hF
i
iK
i
B (m+1), R2
(m+3) hF
i
iK
i
(B ! A) Ind. Hyp., (l)
(m+4) K
i
(B ! A)! [F
i
]K
i
(B ! A) DE3
(m+5) hF
i
i[F
i
]K
i
(B ! A) (m+3), (m+4)
(m+6) hF
i
i(hF
i
iK
i
B ^ [F
i
]K
i
(B ! A)) (m+2), (m+5)
(m+7) hF
i
ihF
i
i(K
i
B ^K
i
(B ! A)) (m+6)
(m+8) hF
i
ihF
i
ihF
i
iK
i
A (m+7), DE1
(m+9) hF
i
iK
i
A (m+8)
Rule R4 can now be derived as follows:
(1) A! B Ass.
(2) K
i
A Ass.
(3) hF
i
iK
i
(A! B) (1), R3
(4) [F
i
]K
i
A DE3, (2)
(5) hF
i
i(K
i
(A! B) ^K
i
A) (3), (4)
(6) hF
i
ihF
i
iK
i
B (5), DE1
(7) hF
i
iK
i
B (6)
(8) K
i
A! hF
i
iK
i
B (2), (7)
A.2 Proof of Theorem 10
1. K
i
A ^ hF
i
iK
i
(A! B)! hF
i
iK
i
B
(1) K
i
A Ass.
(2) hF
i
iK
i
(A! B) Ass.
(3) [F
i
]K
i
A DE3, (1)
(4) hF
i
i(K
i
(A! B) ^K
i
A) (2), (3)
(5) hF
i
ihF
i
iK
i
B (4), DE1
(6) hF
i
iK
i
B (5)
2. K
i
A ^K
i
B ! hF
i
iK
i
(A ^B)
(1) K
i
A Ass.
(2) K
i
B Ass.
(3) [F
i
]K
i
A DE3, (1)
(4) [F
i
]K
i
B DE3, (2)
(5) hF
i
iK
i
(A! (B ! (A ^B))) R3
(6) hF
i
i(K
i
A ^K
i
(A! (B ! (A ^B)))) (3), (5)
(7) hF
i
iK
i
(B ! (A ^B)) (6), DE1
(8) hF
i
i(K
i
B ^K
i
(B ! (A ^B))) (4), (7)
(9) hF
i
iK
i
(A ^B) (8)
3. K
i
A ^ hF
i
iK
i
B ! hF
i
iK
i
(A ^B)
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(1) K
i
A Ass.
(2) hF
i
iK
i
B Ass.
(3) [F
i
]K
i
A DE3, (1)
(4) hF
i
i(K
i
A ^K
i
B) (3), (2)
4. K
i
(A ^B)! hF
i
i(K
i
A ^K
i
B)
(1) K
i
(A ^B) Ass.
(2) hF
i
iK
i
A (1), R4
(3) hF
i
i[F
i
]K
i
A (2), DE3
(4) [F
i
]K
i
(A ^B) (1), DE3
(5) [F
i
]hF
i
iK
i
B (4), R4
(6) hF
i
i([F
i
]K
i
A ^ hF
i
iK
i
B) (3), (5)
(7) hF
i
ihF
i
i(K
i
A ^K
i
B) (6)
(8) hF
i
i(K
i
A ^K
i
B) (7)
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